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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in the amount of 
alimony it awarded to Ms. Hales. The standard of appellate review 
is a "clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion." Paffel v. 
Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986); accord Chambers v. Chambers, 
840 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct.App. 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5. See Addendum A for a complete 
recitation of that section. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Course of Proceedings. 
On August 12, 1991, David Hales ("Mr. Hales") filed for 
divorce to dissolve his marriage of approximately 25 years to 
Sandra Gillman Hales ("Ms. Hales"). The case was tried before 
Judge Ray M. Harding in the Fourth Judicial District Court on 
December 9, 1992, and January 12, 1993. The divorce and property 
distribution phases of the trial were bifurcated, and Judge Harding 
granted the parties a divorce on December 9, 1992. 
Trial resumed on January 12, 1993. The court granted the 
parties joint legal custody of their minor son, with primary 
1 
physical custody awarded to Ms. Hales. Mr. Hales was ordered to 
pay child support in the amount of $750.00 per month and permanent 
alimony in the amount of $1,250.00 per month. Mr. Hales was 
awarded the parties1 business and Ms. Hales was awarded the 
parties' residence, subject to the mortgage thereon. 
Ms. Hales submitted a Motion for Reconsideration on the issue 
of alimony, which the court denied. On February 24, 1993, the 
court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce. On March 12, 1993, Ms. Hales filed her Notice 
of Appeal to this Court on the issue of the alimony award. Mr. 
Hales cross-appealed. 
On September 27, 1994, both parties appeared before this Court 
for oral argument. On that same date, this Court entered its 
Order, concluding that the trial court's Findings of Fact were 
inadequate, and remanded the case to the trial court for additional 
findings and reconsideration of the alimony award based on those 
findings. 
On July 6, 1995, the Fourth Judicial District Court entered 
its Memorandum Decision and Additional Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law1, requiring Mr. Hales to pay child support in 
the amount of $750.00 per month and alimony in the amount of 
$1,250.00 per month. The court did not issue or enter an amended 
1
 Attached as "Exhibit A." 
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Decree of Divorce. Rather, it expressly adopted its previous 
Decree2, entered on February 24, 1993, which awarded child support 
in the amount of $750.00 per month and alimony in the amount of 
$1,250.00 per month. On August 3, 1995, Ms. Hales filed her second 
Notice of Appeal. 
B. Statement of Material Facts. 
1. The parties were married on December 21, 1967 in Orem, 
Utah, a marriage of approximately 25 years. (Exhibit A if 2; Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 160. ) 
2. Ms. Hales was born on June 2, 1946, and was 46 at the 
time of trial. (Exhibit A 1f 4; Tr. Rec. 31.) 
3. During the marriage the parties had two children, a 
daughter and a son, born as issue of the marriage. At the time of 
trial, their daughter was eighteen years of age and their son was 
fourteen. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 160.) 
4. Since the parties' separation in August of 1991, Ms. 
Hales has had custody of the parties' minor son. (Tr. Vol. I, 
pp. 160-61, 163.) 
5. The parties1 minor son, Corbin, was a nationally ranked 
competitive tennis player. Substantial costs were incurred by Ms. 
Hales for Corbinfs training, equipment and travel costs (including 
Attached as "Exhibit B." 
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Ms. Hales1 travel costs) to attend the tournaments. (Tr. Vol. I, 
p. 161-2.) 
6. Since the parties' separation in August of 1991 to the 
time the Decree of Divorce was entered, Mr. Hales did not make 
mortgage or rental payments for his own benefit. (Tr. Vol. I, 
pp. 1-14.) 
7. Ms. Hales' role within the family during the entire 
course of the marriage was that of full-time housewife and mother. 
(Exhibit A V 4; Tr. Vol. I, p. 169.) 
8. Ms. Hales was not employed, and had not been employed at 
all during the term of her marriage, with the sole exception of a 
short period of time when the parties1 business began its 
operations. (Exhibit A M 4; Tr. Vol. I, pp. 169-70.) 
9. Ms. Hales1 post-high school education consists of one 
year of college. (Exhibit A V 4; Tr. Vol. I, pp. 169-70.) 
10. During the course of the marriage, and during the 
pendency of the divorce, the only income Ms. Hales received was 
money given to her by Mr. Hales. Throughout the marriage, she was 
totally dependent upon him for financial support. (Tr. Vol. I, 
pp. 171-72.) 
11. Ms. Hales1 current monthly expenses for her and the 
parties' minor son total approximately $4,483.28. (Tr. Vol. I, 
pp. 196-201.) 
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12. The court found that Mr. Hales had concealed substantial 
amounts of cash from the IRS and, based on evidence presented at 
trial, the court established Mr. Hales1 gross monthly income at 
$8,333.00. (Exhibit A 1f 3; Tr. Rec, pp. 221-23.) 
13. Mr. Hales1 income allowed the parties to acquire a home 
with a net value of over $100,000.00, a profitable business as well 
as luxury items such as two boats, one valued at $8,000.00 and the 
other at $180,000.00, and a Jaguar automobile for which $30,000.00 
cash was paid at the time of purchase. (Exhibit A 1f 9-14; Tr. 
Rec., pp. 221-23. ) 
14. Based upon a monthly income of $8,333.00, the court fixed 
Mr. Hales' monthly child support obligation at $750.00. (Exhibit 
B 1f 10; Tr. Rec, pp. 221-23.) 
15. The court likewise found that because Ms. Hales lacked 
specific job skills, and considering Mr. Hales1 income, Ms. Hales 
was to be awarded permanent alimony. (Exhibit A 1f 15, Tr. Rec, 
pp. 221-23.) 
16. Despite the fact that (i) Ms. Hales--with one minor 
exception— had never been employed outside the home (Exhibit A 1f 
4; Tr. Vol. I, pp. 169-70); (ii) Ms. Hales lacked employable skills 
or training (Exhibit A 1f 15; Tr. Rec, pp. 221-23); (iii) 
throughout the course of their marriage Ms. Hales was entirely 
dependent on Mr. Hales for financial support for herself and the 
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parties' minor son (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 171-72); (iv) Ms. Hales* 
monthly obligations totalled $4,483.28 (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 196-201); 
(v) Mr. Hales was not making any mortgage or rental payments for 
his own benefit (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 1-14); (vi) Mr. Hales' monthly 
income was found to be $8,333.00 (Exhibit A ir 3; Tr. Rec, pp. 221-
23); and (vii) Mr. Hales' child support obligation was to be based 
on a gross monthly income of $8,333.00 (Exhibit A If 7; Tr. Rec, 
pp. 221-23), the court awarded Ms. Hales alimony in the amount of 
only $1,250.00 per month (Exhibit A V 15; Tr. Rec, pp. 221-23). 
17. Ms. Hales appealed the trial court's decision regarding 
the alimony award. On September 27, 1994, the Utah Court of 
Appeals heard oral arguments. On that same day, the Court remanded 
the case to the trial court for additional findings and a 
reconsideration of the award based on those findings (Exhibit D). 
18. On July 6, 1995, the trial court entered its Additional 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, reaffirming its alimony 
award of $1,250.00, incorporating the Decree of Divorce entered on 
February 24, 1993, and essentially making no new findings regarding 
Ms. Hales' financial condition and need. (Exhibit A). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court clearly abused its discretion in the amount of 
alimony it awarded to Ms. Hales. The evidence at trial 
conclusively established that Ms. Hales was, and in all likelihood 
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would continue to be entirely dependent upon Mr. Hales for 
financial support. The evidence also showed that Ms. Hales had 
acquired no marketable skills or training. Moreover, Mr. Hales1 
income had allowed the parties to become accustomed to a lifestyle 
that included luxury boats, a luxury automobile and substantial 
travel. These and other factors, resulted in Ms. Hales incurring 
monthly expenses of not less than $4,483.28. Finally, the trial 
court specifically found that Mr. Hales' monthly income was not 
less than $8,333.00 and the trial court further fixed child support 
payments based upon that amount. 
In spite of Ms. Hales' established need, long-term dependence, 
absence of skills or training, accustomed lifestyle, and Mr. Hales' 
relatively minor monthly expenses and clear ability to provide 
support, the trial court awarded only $1,250.00 total monthly 
alimony. The trial court abused its discretion in that: (i) the 
alimony award fails to take into account Ms. Hales' established 
expenses and economic condition; (ii) the award of alimony fails to 
equalize Mr. Hales' and Ms. Hales' standards of living; and (iii) 
the award of alimony does not enable Ms. Hales to enjoy the same 
standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE ALIMONY AWARD FAILS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT MS, HALES' 
ESTABLISHED EXPENSES AND ECONOMIC CONDITION 
It is well established that a trial court must specifically 
consider the following three factors when setting an alimony award: 
H(1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving 
spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to 
produce a sufficient income for him or herself; and (3) 
the ability of the responding spouse to provide support." 
Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
(quoting Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P. 2d 84, 90 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989)). 
This Court has stated unequivocally that a "![f]ailure to 
analyze the parties1 circumstances in light of these three factors 
constitutes an abuse of discretion.'" Thronson v. Thronson, 810 
P.2d 428, 435 (Utah Ct.App. 1991) (citing Paffel v. Paffel, 732 
P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986)). 
In fact, the paramount factor a trial court needs to confront 
in setting a proper award of alimony is the financial condition and 
need of the receiving spouse: 
In exercising its discretion in determining the amount of 
alimony to be awarded, the trial court must consider the 
financial condition and needs of the spouse claiming 
support . . . . 
Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) (emphasis 
added)• 
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Here, the evidence adduced at trial established Ms, Halesf 
monthly expenses at $4,483.28. The trial court's award of child 
support and alimony result in a monthly disposable income for 
Ms. Hales of only $1,917.00. Although this level of support is 
grossly disproportionate to Ms. Hales' monthly needs, the trial 
court failed to consider this fact, or to make specific findings of 
fact regarding her financial and economic condition. This error 
alone requires a reversal of the alimony award. 
In its Memorandum Decision and Additional Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, the trial court found that "although defendant 
has no specific job skills, she is not precluded from obtaining 
employment or reeducating herself in order to find some form of 
suitable full-time employment." Exhibit A, 1f 15. Conspicuously 
absent from the record and from the court's Findings is any 
discussion of what constitutes suitable full-time employment, 
including benefits and compensation. 
Although the Findings do address Ms. Hales' lack of skill and 
training, they are essentially silent as to her specific economic 
condition and financial needs. However, it is clear that the trial 
court did consider Ms. Hales' needs and income, together with Mr. 
Hales' income, when it determined the appropriate level of child 
support. In fact, the child support award of $750.00 is based, in 
accordance with the then existing uniform guidelines, on an income 
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of $0 for Ms. Hales and an established income of $8,333.00 for Mr. 
Hales. 
Yet, in its determination of alimony, the trial court 
seemingly ignored Ms. Hales' need and lack of ability to support 
herself, and Mr. Hales' ability to provide the necessary support. 
The court offered no justification for its consideration of a level 
of income at $0 for Ms. Hales and $8,333.00 for Mr. Hales in its 
child support determination, while apparently dispensing entirely 
with any consideration of these income levels in its alimony 
determination. 
This Court has considered awards under similar circumstances. 
In Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah Ct.App. 1991), this 
Court overturned the trial court's award of temporary alimony of 
one year's duration. The Court found that the appellant required 
$800.00 per month support to meet her needs, and that, based on his 
income and living expenses, the appellee had some discretionary 
income with which to meet her economic needs. See e.g., Schaumberg 
v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (Utah Ct.App. 1994) (award upheld on 
appeal where appellee testified to a need of $2,272.58 and award, 
along with other income, gave her a disposable income of 
$2,389.00). 
Here, the trial court's award of $1,250.00 will leave Ms. 
Hales with a substantial shortfall of income compared to her 
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established needs of $4,483.28. Furthermore, Mr. Halesf monthly 
income of $8,333.00 leaves him with considerable discretionary 
income. The record and the trial court's express Findings do not 
support the award of alimony in the amount of $1,250.00. An 
established monthly financial need of $4,483.28 cannot fit into an 
alimony award of only $1,250.00, particularly where, as here, the 
trial court has made no finding as to how Ms. Hales can be expected 
to support herself. The trial court's failure to consider Ms. 
Hales established economic needs and condition is an abuse of 
discretion that must be remedied by this Court. 
II. 
THE ALIMONY AWARD FAILS TO EQUALIZE MR. HALES1 AND MS. HALES1 
STANDARDS OF LIVING 
The Utah Court of Appeals has instructed that "alimony should, 
as far as possible, equalize the parties' respective standards of 
living." Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 112 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(citing Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Ut.Ct.App. 1988)). 
The trial court's failure to enter an award of alimony which would 
allow Ms. Hales to continue to enjoy her marital standard of living 
is all the more objectionable in light of the fact that this 
failure leaves the parties with grossly disproportionate standards 
of living. 
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Based on a monthly gross income of $8,333.00, Mr. Hales would 
have a disposable income of $3,534.00 after paying his taxes, 
alimony, and child support, assuming the figures below: 
Gross income 
Federal Income Tax 
FICA 
State Income Tax 
Alimony 
Child Support 
$3,534 
It should be noted that Mr. Hales' child support obligation 
will end soon, leaving him with a disposable income of $4,284.00. 
Ms. Hales, on the other hand, would have disposable income of 
$1,917.00 after paying her taxes based on receipt of the trial 
court's award of $750.00 child support and $1,250.00 alimony, as 
set forth below: 
Gross income-child support $ 750 
Gross income-alimony 1,250 
Federal Income Tax - 644 
State Income Tax 195 
$1,917 
3
 See Tr. Rec, p. 228 for calculation of these amounts, 
4
 See Tr. Rec, p. 228 for calculation of these amounts. 
5
 See Tr. Rec, p. 227 for calculation of these amounts, 
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Of course, after Mr. Hales* child support obligation ceases, 
Ms. Hales1 disposable income will drop to $1,167.00. This division 
of disposable income is inequitable on its face, particularly in 
light of the parties1 long term marriage and the specific finding 
of the trial court that Ms. Hales lacked the skill, training and 
experience necessary to allow her to meet her own economic needs. 
In determining an award of alimony in a divorce, the trial 
court is obligated to divide the income equitably. As the Utah 
Supreme Court has plainly stated: 
The overarching aim of a property division, 
and of the decree of which it and the alimony 
award are subsidiary parts, is to achieve a 
fair, just and equitable result between the 
parties. 
Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added) 
see also Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) (one 
of the primary considerations in achieving such fairness and equity 
is to equalize the parties' respective standards of living). 
This Court has not hesitated to remand alimony awards which 
fail to equalize the parties' standards of living. In Howell v. 
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct.App. 1991), the defendant testified 
to monthly expenses of approximately $5,000.00. The plaintiff had 
a monthly income of $10,000.00 per month. The court awarded 
alimony and child support in the amount of $3,163.00, and found 
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that the defendant had the ability to earn a salary of $645.00 per 
month. 
This Court held that this award was insufficient, noting that, 
after plaintiff's child support obligation ceased, he would have a 
gross monthly income of $8,200.00, in comparison to defendant's 
income of $2,445.00. The Court noted that "[t]he alimony set by 
the court does not come close to equalizing the parties' standard 
of living as of the time of the divorce, but allows plaintiff a two 
to four times advantage." Id. at 1213. 
Here, the difference between Mr. Hales' disposable income of 
$3,534.00 and Ms. Hales' disposable income of $1,917.00 represents 
a disparity of almost 2:1; for every dollar of disposable income 
available to Mr. Hales, Ms. Hales has but $0.50. Additionally, Ms. 
Hales' personal expenses are $4,483.28 a month while, at the time 
of trial, Mr. Hales was making no mortgage, rent or utility 
payments on his own behalf. The inequity of the trial court's 
distribution of income is stark and undeniable. The award of 
alimony must be overturned on this basis alone, and an award 
entered which meets the required goal of equalizing the parties' 
standards of living. An alimony award of $2,392.00 which equitably 
divides Mr. Hales' net income would meet this goal. 
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III. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ALIMONY AWARD FAILS TO ENABLE 
MS. HALES TO MAINTAIN THE SAME STANDARD OF 
LIVING SHE ENJOYED DURING THE MARRIAGE 
Utah courts have clearly set forth the purposes of an award of 
alimony. The paramount purpose is to: 
enabl[e] the receiving spouse to maintain, as nearly as 
possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage, and preventing the receiving spouse from 
becoming a public charge. 
Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 121 (Ut.Ct.App. 1990). 
Although there are circumstances where there is simply not 
enough to go around, that is not the case here. The trial court 
made the express finding that Mr. Hales had a monthly income of 
$8,333.00. That income allowed the parties to acquire substantial 
assets, including a successful business which the parties built 
together, a home valued at over $100,000.00, two boats, one valued 
at $8,000.00 and the other at $180,000.00, a Jaguar automobile for 
which $30,000.00 cash was paid at the time of purchase, and 
substantial travel in connection with the tennis activities of the 
parties1 minor son. Furthermore, when setting Mr. Hales1 income, 
the court did not take into account Mr. Hales' established practice 
of spending large sums of cash, and providing Ms. Hales with cash 
for spending money and expenses. 
The evidence further established that Mr. HalesT personal 
expenses were minimal. At the time of the divorce, he was not 
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making any mortgage payments (other than payments on the parties' 
residence made on behalf of Ms. Hales), rent, or utility payments. 
Finally, the evidence established that Ms. Hales' monthly expenses 
totalled not less than $4,483.28, that Ms. Hales lacked employable 
skills or training and that she was entirely dependent on Mr. Hales 
for financial support for herself and the parties' minor son 
throughout the course of their marriage. 
The evidence and findings set forth above do address Mr. 
Hales' ability to provide support and Ms. Hales' inability to 
produce a sufficient income for herself, two of the factors to be 
considered when setting an alimony award. Chambers, 840 P.2d at 
843. Specifically, Mr. Hales' income, which allowed the parties to 
enjoy a well-to-do standard of living, had not materially 
diminished, nor had Mr. Hales incurred expenses which would 
materially affect his ability to provide support for Ms. Hales. 
Ms. Hales, on the other hand, is not capable of providing any 
significant level of support, certainly not a level sufficient to 
meet her monthly needs of $4,483.28. 
Simply stated, the Hales established a comfortable standard of 
living during their marriage which Ms. Hales is not capable of 
maintaining on her own. Mr. Hales, however, continues to be able 
to provide Ms. Hales the financial support necessary to allow her 
to continue her established lifestyle. The evidence and findings 
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are beyond dispute. Accordingly, there is no reason why Ms. Hales 
is not entitled to a continuation of the same level of support she 
enjoyed during the marriage. The trial court offered no 
explanation for impermissibly awarding alimony in an amount less 
than half of what Ms. Hales is legally and factually entitled to. 
In Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Ut.Ct.App. 1991), this 
Court affirmed that, while one purpose of alimony is to allow the 
receiving spouse to maintain the marital standard of living, an 
alimony award should also consider the receiving spouse's "station 
in life." Id. at 1212. Therefore, the trial court's award of 
$1,800.00 a month was remanded where the receiving spouse was in 
her fifties, had been a homemaker throughout the marriage, and had 
no job skills. Under such circumstances, this Court found that 
[i]t is entirely unrealistic to assume that a 
woman in her mid-50's with no substantial work 
experience or training will be able to enter 
the job market and support herself in anything 
even resembling the style in which the couple 
had been living. 
Id. at 1213 (citing Jones v. Jones, 700 P. 2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 
1985)); see also Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P.2d 615 (Ut.Ct.App. 
1988) (alimony award should be affirmed to allow wife of twelve 
years to maintain her marital standard of living, in light of the 
fact that she had no professional training and few marketable 
skills); Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559 (Utah Ct.App. 1993) 
(alimony award upheld where receiving spouse's role was that of 
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homemaker, and income from property division would be insufficient 
to allow her to maintain her marital standard of living). 
Here, it is no less unrealistic for the trial court to expect 
Ms. Hales—who herself is approaching her fifties and has no 
substantial work experience or training--to be able to support 
herself in a style even remotely resembling her marital standard of 
living on an alimony award of $1,250.00. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion in setting an award of 
alimony which fails to realize the goals of alimony under Utah law. 
The award fails for three reasons. First, it fails to consider Ms. 
Halesf demonstrated financial needs and economic condition. 
Second, it fails to equalize the parties1 disposable income. 
Third, it fails to allow Ms. Hales to maintain the standard of 
living she enjoyed during her marriage. 
Because the trial court's award of alimony is not supported by 
adequate factual findings, it must be reversed, and an award 
entered commensurate with Ms. Hales' needs and inability to provide 
for her own support, and Mr. Hales' ability to provide support. 
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Additionally, Ms. Hales requests an award of attorneys fees 
and costs incurred in this appeal. 
DATED this /Q day of February, 1996. 
MAACK & SI 
JUARK W. 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN 
KRISTINE EDDE 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Sandra Gillman Hales 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / ^ day of February 1996, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was mailed, 
postage prepaid, first-class, to: 
Ellen Maycock 
Pamela S. Nighswonger 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah J£^01-2034 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DAVID HALES, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs. 
SANDRA GILLMAN HALES, 
Defendant/Appellant• Case No. 930158-CA 
ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
EXHIBIT A 
EXHIBIT B 
EXHIBIT C 
EXHIBIT D 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ADDITIONAL 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
DECREE OF DIVORCE, dated February 24, 
1993, and expressly adopted in the 
Memorandum Decision 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 
ORDER OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, DATED 
SEPTEMBER 27, 1994 
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Exhibit A 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID HALES, 
vs. 
SANDRA GILLMAN HALES, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CASE NO. 914401*06 
DATE: July 6, 1995 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
LAW CLERK: Laura Cabanilla 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
EXTERN: Andrew Pickering 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial before the Court on December 9, 
1992 and was thereafter continued to January 12, 1993 at which time trial, following 
argument of counsel for the parties, was concluded. The Court heard and considered the 
evidence and testimony presented by the parties and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on February 24, 1993. 
The matter was thereafter appealed and cross-appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals 
and on September 27, 1994, the Utah Court of Appeals entered its conclusion and decision, 
remitting the case for the entry of additional findings of fact and reconsideration of the 
awards based on those findings. 
The Court, pursuant to the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals that additional 
findings be made in this matter, with reconsideration of all awards based on those findings, 
makes and enters the following Additional Findings of Fact and Additional Conclusions of 
Law. 
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ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant are residents of Utah County, State of Utah, and have been for 
more than three months prior to filing this divorce action. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on December 21, 1967 in Orem, Utah. 
3. Plaintiff was 49 years old at the time of trial, and has been self-employed at Myrons 
Auto Wrecking, 1775 South State Street^ Orem, Utah, since February, 1980. Plaintiff is 
employed on a full-time basis. The Court finds that Plaintiffs gross monthly income is 
$8,333.00. 
4. The Court finds that Defendant's role within the family during the course of the 
marriage has been that of a full-time housewife and mother. Defendant was 46 years old at 
the time of trial, is a high school graduate with one year of college training, and has been a 
full-time housewife and mother during the marriage. Defendant has been employed during 
the marriage for a brief period of time while helping Plaintiff when the parties' business 
operations commenced. Defendant currently has no monthly income from employment. 
5. The Court finds that during the course of the marriage the parties had two children: a 
daughter, Angila, born November 22, 1968; and a son, Corbin, born July 19, 1978. At the 
time of trial, Angila had reached the age of majority, and is not a consideration in the 
determination of any awards made. However, at the time of trial Corbin had not reached the 
age of majority. 
6. The Court finds that the stipulation for custody and visitation which the parties have 
entered into with regard to their minor son Corbin is fair, just, and equitable and in the child's 
best interests. Each of the parties should be awarded joint legal custody of Corbin, with the 
Defendant being awarded the primary physical custody subject to Plaintiffs rights to 
reasonable visitation. 
7. Based on findings that Plaintiff has a gross monthly income of $8,333.00 and that 
Defendant has no gross monthly income, the Court finds that Plaintiff is to pay child support 
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in the amount of $750.00 per month. This award is to be paid to the Defendant on the first 
of each month. Child support shall continue until the attainment by Corbin of the age of 
eighteen years or his graduation from high school with his regular graduating class, whichever 
is later. 
8. The Court finds that Plaintiff is able to provide insurance on behalf of Corbin through 
his employment opportunities; however,3efendant is unemployed and has no easy access to 
insurance. Therefore, it is reasonable and just that Plaintiff maintain his present medical and 
life insurance for the benefit of Corbin. The Court also finds that Plaintiff is to name Corbin 
as beneficiary of the term life insurance policy which he currently maintains. It is reasonable 
and just that each party be liable for one-half of all of Corbin's medical expenses not covered 
by insurance. 
9. The Court finds that the parties' equity interests in the business located at 1775 South 
State Street, Orem, Utah, (equity interest approximately $44,000.00) and the house located at 
1595 East 480 South, Pleasant Grove, Utah, (equity interest approximately $60,000.00) are 
essentially equal. Furthermore, Plaintiff has had substantial experience in business operations, 
while Defendant has had very little business experience. Therefore, the Court finds that it is 
reasonable and just to award all right, title and interest in and to the business to Plaintiff, 
subject to the mortgage on that property, and to award all right, title, and interest in and to 
the house to Defendant, subject to the mortgage on that property. 
10. Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the Court finds the Carver boat to have a 
value of $180,000.00. It is reasonable and just that the Carver boat be sold, and the proceeds 
equally divided between the parties, or if the Plaintiff elects, he may retain the boat and pay 
$90,000.00 to Defendant. Plaintiff shall make such election and payment, if any, within 90 
days of the date of the decree. 
11. The Court further finds that it is reasonable and just that Plaintiff assume the following 
debts and obligations and hold Defendant harmless therefrom: 
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(a) Mortgage on the business located at 1775 South State Street, Orem, Utah, 
approximately $111,772.00; 
(b) All other documented debts associated with the business located at 1775 South 
State Street, Orem, Utah; 
(c) First Security Bank credit line, approximately $40,000.00 at $336.00 per 
month; 
(d) R.C. Willey credit line, approximately $300.00 at $25.00 per month; 
(e) Visa credit card balance, approximately $790.98 at $25.00 per month; 
(f) Mastercard credit card balance, approximately $3951.22 at $150.00 per month; 
(g) Boat slip obligation, at approximately $305.00 per month; 
(h) All costs associated with Corbin's tennis expenses which have not yet been 
paid and are outstanding, whether on a credit card balance or as a loan not the 
subject of the other debts and obligations the Plaintiff is to assume set forth 
above; 
(i) All other documented personal debts presently outstanding incurred by the 
parties. 
12. The Court finds that it is reasonable and just that Defendant assume the following 
debts and obligation and hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom: 
(a) First mortgage on the house at 1595 East 480 South, Pleasant Grove, Utah, 
approximately $25,000.00 at $366.00 per month. 
13. The Court finds that it is reasonable and just that Plaintiff be awarded the following 
personal property: 
(a) The IRA currently in his name, valued at $4,223.00; 
(b) The 1989 Ford truck, valued at $5,000.00; 
(c) Jewelry valued at $2,500.00; 
(d) The GlasTron (small) boat, valued at $8,000.00; 
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(e) Ili(Ji kcougji ii'ioiuil, '»,iliit*il ii 1 I 1 "' """"" 
The combined value of the personal property so a^ardcJ ; . ). 
14. . The Court finds that it is reasonable and just thai Dei, uiam be awarded the following 
personal property: 
The i°87 Jaeuar XJS, valued at Si *'•: -
(t h - i.^nvc i^rn.sninus assOciatec u ^ i \*) nouse at 1595 East 480 South, 
rleajant Gr^ve. 1 tali. aLed r ; ' 
(c^ Jewelry val ,ed at $>,r< • 
(d) The ERA currently in her name, valued at $1,927.00. 
The combined value of the personal property so awarded is S'! 8,427,00, The Court finds 'that 
this award is fair and equitable in light of the distribution of the business and associated 
pro* -", : ;.< t-- % -v. th-.* AI: e^  
15. Basee ,%n -j.e abo\ endings jegarding the .-•• " /.*• ..**.•-.;.. s* 
earning potential, the Court finds that Plaintiff is jHe to pro. de suppc. ;oi Detendani -• -j.e 
form of alimony. The parties enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle during the marriage, and the 
Court finds that Defendant; is capable of continuing to enjoy : similar lifestyle with an 
alimony award of $1,250 00, a khud -u^vv^ .rw- * -.*f $"^0 -\ the IRA funds awarded her, 
the equitj ii I the hoi ise, an ::i .-•
 t ;o^-ed^ : .. . vei. ,*s a :e **r of Plaintiffs election 
regarding the Carver boat (approximate'* S -^ 'v< • • s; Unduiys 
regarding attorney's fees as set i u Mow are taken into account in maxi.:g r-.s finding I hi* 
Court finds further that though Defendant has no specific job skills, she is not precluded from . 
obtaining employment or reeducating herself in order to find some form of suitable full-time 
employment. Therefore, considering the division of property, the circumstances and needs of 
t .. > ait , Pla* %f:\ abihtv to provide support, the Court finds that Defendant is 
entitled :• / i ^ ' amount of $1,250.00 pei i i lonth. I his alimonj " 
awird shaw continue unu :h. vioa-! /.i of the parties, the Defendant's remarnag*: 
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Defendant's cohabitation with a person of the opposite sex, and shall be paid on the first day 
of each month. 
17. Based on the respective needs of the parties and the previously entered findings as to 
income, debt assumption, and property distribution, the Court finds that Defendant has hired 
an attorney to represent her in this matter, and is in less of a position to be able to pay 
attorney's fees. Therefore, Defendant is^o be awarded judgment for reasonable attorney's fees 
in the amount of $8,000.00. 
18. All other Findings of Fact previously made by the Court as entered February 24, 1993 
which are not specifically superseded by these additional findings are adopted herein, and are 
found to be fair, just, and equitable. 
Based on the foregoing Additional Findings of Fact, the Court makes and enters the 
following: 
ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court adopts herein in all respects the Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce 
previously made and entered on February 24, 1993. 
Dated this 6th day of July, 1995. 
cc: Clark W. Sessions, Esq. 
Thomas V. Rasmussen, Esq. 56e>.. -
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Exhibit B 
THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN, -'- i 
RONALD C. WOLTHUIS, #4 699 
MORTON, SKEEN & RASMUSSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 484-3000 
IN THE DISTRICT CCUF"1 ^ T 
IN AND FOR UTAh 
RTH ""T5ICIAL DISTRICT 
MATE OF UTAH 
DA\ rTD HALES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civ i ] No, 91 -44 014 0 6 DA 
J udge Ra} I I Har c:i ing 
The abcve-ent tied matter cant- regularly for trial before 
the Honorable °~ H^~d*~~ ~~ -~~ A+-- ^ . - ^ecpmber, 1?92 and 
w - . , -. ^  -. j-r -w.ich 
time trial ^ J . GO; eluded. Plaintiff appeared person •- il . 
stages ?-* ~r- :ri? and t* represented ; • — s -^  nsel Thr^.as V, 
Ra:; * :„j : -:: i . •.
 :--
and was iepresentea by ner counsel Clark W. Sessions, 3otn tarties 
provided evidence and testimony to the .\ u ifter which ~N- r^i~~ 
t - ; • • i 
this matter ar.; i: . \ * n^ i-v .ew--j a* . w i a - ^ e L. ~
 ; en ted <i :a the 
testimony ;: the parties and their respective witnesses, and the 
Coi lr t ai I I RXM* • : 
and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from Defendant on 
the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same to become final 
upon execution and entry herein, 
2. Each of the parties are awarded the joint legal custody of 
the parties minor child with Defendant being awarded primary 
physical custody, subject to Plaintifffs rights to reasonable and 
liberal visitation. 
3. Plaintiff is ordered to pay existing expenses for "tennis" 
which have not been paid and are outstanding as a credit card 
balance or loan. In the event Plaintiff fails to pay said sums, 
said sums shall be reduced to judgment. 
4. Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay all documented 
business and personal debts presently outstanding and shall hold 
Defendant harmless from liability thereon with the exception of the 
first mortgage on the parties1 home which is to be assumed and paid 
by Defendant holding Plaintiff harmless from liability thereon. 
5. Plaintiff is ordered to maintain present medical and life 
insurance coverage for the benefit of the parties1 minor child. 
Plaintiff is ordered to name the parties1 minor child as 
beneficiary of the life insurance policy. Each party shall be 
responsible for payment of one-half of all the minor child's 
medical expenses not covered by insurance. 
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6. efendant - 3 awarded the parties 1 home free and c] ear of 
a !' '; i i ta} e c f I 11 I =i r a s s 1 imp t i o 1: 1 o f !:: h • = f :i r s t 
mortgage thereon. 
7. Plaintiff Is awarded h:s business and property associated 
therewi t:l 1 fr • = •  = f] : • :: 11 < ' . i " 1 
of all encumbrances thereon. 
8. Each of the parties are awarded the following personal 
proper I:;  > : 
To the Plaintiff: xr^ $4,223.00 
5,000.00 
:,50o.oo 
iiasTron) 8.ooo,00 
20,000.00 
5,000.00 
9. In "**rcies are ordered 'to - - \*v. ::ci^ - .h has 
been stipulated to have a va 1 ue -• . .. . * .3 the 
proceeds from, the sale of said bca* equal. : .5 in tiff sia\ elect 
to retai" th° r~*- 3nd pay Defendant *">•'* ^: % s* "^  d ~l^~t^Tn and 
p.s^ r-J t:h i n ' jee of 
Divorce. 
efenda^*" is awardsi child support for the parties 1 M n T 
Chi \ lpOI 1 I: ] "I L i l t I I 1 • 1 j. J :-.-.$ 
monthly income or . ^  , 33 5. •_ J , 
xx. Defendant is awarded permanent alimony In the sum of 
3 
7 inf1 Jaguar 
I lone Furnishings 
Jewelry 
IRA 
$1,250,00 per month. Said alimony shall continue until the death 
of either party, Defendant's remarriage or unlawful co-habitation 
with an individual of the opposite sex. 
12. Defendant is awarded judgment against Plaintiff in the sum 
of $8,000.00 as and for attorney's fees. 
DATED THIS day of February, 1993. 
BY THEUCOURT 
RAY M. HARDING J—— 
DV^t^ict Court JudgefV 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify this JUL 
day of February, 1993, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce was mailed, by 
placing the same in the United States Mail, postage pre-paid, 
addressed as follows: 
Clark W. Sessions, Esq. 
Dean C. Adreason, Esq. 
Robert W. Cottle, Esq. 
Campbell, Maack & Sessions 
One Utah Center, 13th Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(MWUL jc/;j/y>AtAJ 
Hales.dec 
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Exhibit C 
DIVORCE 30-3-5 
!{()•;J ! Disposition of property — Maintenance and health 
care of parties and children — Court to have con-
tinuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — 
Termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious peti-
tion for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equita-
ble orders relating to the children, property, and parties. The court shall 
include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; and 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the 
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental 
care insurance for the dependent children. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the non-custodial parent to provide 
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the dis-
tribution of the property as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
relatives, the court shall consider the welfare of the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically termi-
nates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage 
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if 
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his 
rights are determined. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further 
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or associa-
tion is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions 
of a court order is made and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay 
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, 
if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted in 
good faith. 
History: R-S. 189S & CJL 1907, § 1?12; L. added Subsection (2); designated two undesig-
1909, ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S. nated paragraphs as Subsections (3) and (4); 
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3; inserted "In determining" and "the court" in 
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch. Subsection (4); redesignated former Subsec-
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1. tions (2) and (3) as Subsections (5) and (6); di-
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend- vided Subsection (5) into two sentences, substi-
ment by Chapter 72 rewrote Subsection (1); tuting "However, if the remarriage" for "unless 
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FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
SEP 2 71994 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
David Hales , 
Plaintiff, Appellee, and 
Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
Sandra Gillman Hales, 
Defendant, Appellant, and 
Cross-Appellee. 
ORDER 
Case No. 930158-CA 
Before Judges Orme, Bench, and Greenwood. 
This matter is before the court pursuant to Rule 31 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
We conclude that the findings of fact are inadequate. 
Accordingly, we remand for entry of additional findings and 
reconsideration of the awards based on those findings. 
DATED this 27th day of September, 1994. 
Gregoj^K.^Jrme, Judge 
. Greenwood,1 Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 27th day of ^ptember, 1994, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the 
United States mail to the parties listed below: 
Clark W. Sessions 
Dean C. Andreasen 
Campbell, Maack & Sessions 
Attorneys at Law 
One Utah Center, 13th Floor 
201 South Main 
Salt Lake City, UT R4111-2215 
Randall L. Skeen 
Thomas V. Rasmussen 
Ronald C. Wolthuis 
Morton, Skeen & Rasmussen 
Attorneys at Law 
1245 Brickyard Road, #600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Fourth District Court Trial Ct. No. 914401406 DA 
Attn: Janet Dorny, Appeals Clerk 
125 North 100 West 
Provo, UT 84601 
Honorable Ray M. Harding 
District Court Judge 
125 North 100 West 
Provo, UT 84601 
Dated this 27th day of September, 1994. 
By , Jru ^wf4/i^ 
Deputy Clerk 
